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OUT OF CONTROL? THE USES AND ABUSES
OF PARENTAL LIABILITY LAWS TO CONTROL
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN THE
UNITED STATES
Linda A. Chapin*

I.

INTRODUCTION

How do we as a society control the antisocial and criminal acts of children? Particularly, how do we perceive the role
of the parent in this effort? The primary right of the parent to
the custody and control of his or her child, and the attendant
responsibility of the parent for his or her child, is a well-accepted principle of U.S. law.1 However, when a child commits
acts of juvenile delinquency,2 the point at which the larger
society should intervene in the parent-child relationship, and
the nature of the intervention, is not clear.
At different times in the recent history of the United
States, different approaches to the problem of juvenile delinquency, and different attitudes about the role of the parent in
the child's delinquency, have been popular.
At the turn of the 20th century, the reform movement
advocated removing children from their parents' custody and
* Assistant Professor, Western State University College of Law; Hastings
College of Law, J.D. (1975); California State University at Long Beach, M.S.W.
(1995). I wish to thank my thesis advisor and professor at CSULB, Dr. John
Oliver, for the initial idea for this article, and our discussions upon this topic.
Also, I wish to thank my colleagues at WSU, including professors Leslie Dery,
Carol Ebbinghouse, Susan Keller, Gloria Sanchez, Michael Schwartz and Edith
Warkentine, as well as research librarians Cindy Parkhurst and Anne Rimmer.
In addition, I wish to thank WSU students and former students who helped in
the initial research or final editing: Tracy McKinney, Karen Mateer, and
Linda-Nell Vose.
1. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
2. For the purposes of this article, the term "juvenile delinquency" is given
its broader definition to include not only acts committed which would have been
punishable as crimes if committed by an adult, but also to include acts which
would not have been punishable if committed by an adult, such as truancy and
curfew violations.
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substituting the juvenile court as parens patriae.3 By the
middle of the 20th century, came the recognition that the juvenile court was primarily punishing children, not reforming
them.4 Also at that time, parental liability laws began to be
adopted in many states, which greatly expanded the common
law tort and criminal liability of parents for the juvenile delinquent acts of their children. 5
These laws, it is argued, were adopted to control juvenile
delinquency by making parents responsible for their children's actions. A review of the cases, both tort and criminal,
reveals an explicit or implicit rationale for these parental liability laws: punish or threaten to punish the parent for the
acts of his or her child, and that parent will exercise better
control over the child, reducing or eliminating acts of juvenile
delinquency by that child.6
Parental responsibility for juvenile delinquency was being emphasized by the enactment of parental liability laws by
many states in the 1950's and 1960's.7 By the late 1960's,
during the "war on poverty" initiated by President Johnson's
administration,' there was also a focus on the social causes of
delinquency. Although the importance of the family environment and the role of the parent in raising the child was acknowledged, the role of social factors, such as poverty, urban
slums, and lack of access to resources such as playgrounds,
education and employment opportunities, were emphasized.9
Defining the problem of juvenile delinquency in terms of social factors suggested solutions requiring sweeping social reform through government intervention and resources. 10
3. See discussion infra Part II. "Parens patriae,' literally 'parent of the
country,' refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane ....It is the principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such
as minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents." BLAci's LAw
DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
4. See discussion infra Part II.
5. See discussion infra Part III.
6. See discussion infra Part III.
7. See discussion infra Part III.
8. See generally DAVID ZAREFSKY, PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S WAR ON POVERTY:
RHETORIC AND HISTORY (1986).
9. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 55-89 (1967) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT].

10. See id. at 66-77, 293-94.
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If juvenile delinquency deeply disturbed us as a society
in the 1960's, it horrifies us in the 1990's, with evidence that
in the last ten years juvenile crime has not only increased,
but become more violent.1 1 Thus, at the threshold of the 21st
century, the causes of juvenile delinquency and the role of the
parent are again being scrutinized. Now, big government is
out, downsizing is in, and a Democratic president, as well as
a Republican-controlled Congress, has supported substantial
reductions in the federal welfare system, which provides benefits to poor parents and their children. 1 2 The leaders of both
parties have emphasized "family values" and the importance
of parents in the prevention of juvenile antisocial behavior
and criminal acts. 3
The most effective way to prevent crime is to assure all citizens full
opportunity to participate in the benefits and responsibilities of society. Especially in inner cities, achievement of this goal will require
extensive overhauling and strengthening of the social institutions influential in making young people strong members of the communityschools, employment, the family, religious institutions, housing, welfare, and others. Careful planning and evaluation and enormous increases in money and personnel are needed to expand existing programs of promise and to develop additional approaches.
Id. at 293.
The President's Commission Report, written at approximately the time of
the Supreme Court's decision in In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), also criticized
the lack of procedural due process in the juvenile justice system, and recommended procedural safeguards for juveniles such as restricted prehearing detentions, notice, and representation by counsel. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at 85-87, 294.
11. See Dan Coats, Coats Says Federal Government Incomplete on Juvenile
Crime, Congressional Press Releases, FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE, July
15, 1996; Neal R. Peirce, Juvenile Crime Dip: Can We Build on It?, NATION'S
CITIES WKLY., Sept. 16, 1996, at 4.
12. See Gene Gibbons, Clinton Highlights Welfare Reform as Campaign
Trip Starts, REUTERS NORTH AMERICAN WIRE, Sept. 10, 1996; Virginia Ellis,
Faye Fiore & Mark Gladstone, Reforms to Allow State to Make Cuts; Impact:
Welfare Benefits Would Be Reduced for Poor Parents and Children, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 1996, at Al (Home Edition).
13. See, supra note 12; Remarks Via Satellite by the Presumptive Republican Nominee for PresidentRobert J. Dole, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, July 16,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew file. In his remarks to the
National Governor's Association at their national conference, former senator
Dole stated: "And we know where the explanation [for violent teenage crime]
starts: The failures of families have left a moral and spiritual vacuum at the
core of children's lives. A moral compass is always a gift of a caring adult, and
families transmit values that can defeat violence. In the long run, the best anticrime program is the renewal of family life in America." Id. See generally
Michael Barone, The Year of the Great ParentalPitch, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REP., Sept. 9, 1996, at 7.
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Should we as a society realistically depend primarily
upon parents to stem the rising tide of juvenile delinquency
in the United States? The rationale behind the parental liability laws-punishing the parents to reduce acts of juvenile
delinquency by their children-must be based upon a series
of interconnected assumptions. First, that a child's behavior
is primarily due to the parents' actions or inactions and not to
other factors; adequate parenting results in a well-behaved
and law-abiding child, while poor parenting results in a juvenile delinquent. Thus, parental action or inaction is perceived as a primary cause, if not the cause, of juvenile
delinquency.
Second, there is presumed to be a universal model of adequate parenting which is generally applicable, regardless of
other factors, such as race, ethnicity, culture, social class, economic status, or other personal or socio-economic factors.
Thus, all parents are presumed to know what adequate
parenting is, and to have both the ability and the resources to
adequately parent; if they are not, then it follows that they
must be intentionally or negligently avoiding doing what they
know they should do, and can do. Either civil or criminal
"punishment" is therefore justified as a means of reforming
the parent, to reform the child. The punishment, or threat of
punishment, is assumed to cause the parent to adopt the
"good" parenting practices which will then result in a reduction or elimination of juvenile delinquency in the child.
Have these assumptions been borne out in the uses of parental liability legislation in the last thirty or forty years in
the United States, since these laws were widely adopted in
most states? There is almost no information on whether parental liability laws have actually resulted in a reduction in
juvenile delinquency; the little (and mainly anecdotal) infor14
mation available suggests that they have not.
Although the enactment of the parental liability laws
shows a willingness by society to blame parents for juvenile
delinquency, there appears to be, at the same time, a reluctance to actually punish parents for their parenting, unless
the parent has actively encouraged or solicited the child's delinquent act. A discussion of the uses of one criminal parental liability law in Los Angeles, California, is offered as an
14. See discussion infra Part III.

PARENTAL LIABILITY

1997]

625

example of the tension between society's desire to blame parents for the juvenile delinquency of their children, and society's reluctance to actually punish them. 5 Tacitly acknowledging the difficulty of convicting parents for a failure to
adequately supervise and control children involved in juvenile gang activity, the city attorney's office has instead pursued a policy of referring parents to parenting classes
through a statutorily approved diversion program, with the
threat of criminal prosecution if they do not attend.' 6 Under
the City of Los Angeles approach, rather than being perceived as malicious or lazy, parents are perceived as merely
untrained. Less punitive than fines or incarceration,
mandatory parenting classes are a means of holding parents
accountable for their children's acts, while conceding that
their failure in parenting may not be intentional, or even negligent. Unfortunately, the Los Angeles City Attorney's office
has apparently not attempted any assessment of the effectiveness of the parenting classes it is so assiduously

promoting.

17

Turning to the theories and research on the causes of juvenile delinquency, this article argues that a primary focus
on parental responsibility for juvenile delinquency is ill advised; neither theoretical models nor available empirical research suggest that parental action or inaction is the primary
cause ofjuvenile delinquency.' 8 In certain situations, such as
juvenile gang involvement by a child, parental action or inaction appears to be eclipsed by other factors as the primary
cause of the child's delinquent acts.' 9 Although there is some
evidence that parenting skills can be improved by parenting
classes, 20 and that the delinquent acts of children whose parents have taken parenting classes may decrease in some instances, 2 ' this article concludes that more empirical testing
of the uses of parenting classes should be conducted before
parenting classes are widely adopted as a potential means of
reducing juvenile delinquency.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion

infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
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IV.
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V.
V.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

Although discouraged by the failure of the juvenile justice system established by the early 20th century reform
movement and disillusioned about the possibility of government structured social change as envisioned in the 1960's, in
the 1990's we should not ignore the multiplicity of factors
which may contribute to juvenile delinquency and focus myopically on parental responsibility. Offering a tempting target,
parents are not the "problem" and neither parental punishment nor parental training through parenting classes is "the
solution" to the juvenile delinquency conundrum in the
United States. Instead, we must continue to pursue a multiplicity of solutions to this complex social problem; parental
liability laws should be acknowledged as only a partial solution, not effective when children, for a variety of reasons, may
be beyond their parents' control.
Part II of this article briefly discusses the failure of the
reformer's vision of the juvenile court system as a substitute
"good" parent for delinquent children. Part III, explores the
statutory expansion of both tort and criminal parental liability laws, and concludes that the rationale behind the mid20th century increase in the adoption of these laws has been
the goal of controlling juvenile delinquency by punishing the
parent, either with civil damages or criminal penalties. Further, the lack of any reliable information showing that these
laws have in fact resulted in a reduction in juvenile delinquency is emphasized. Part IV examines the Los Angeles,
California practice of referring parents to parenting classes
as an alternative to criminal prosecution to explore whether
parenting classes can be an effective means of controlling juvenile delinquency, even when children are involved in juvenile gang activity and appear to be beyond their parents' control. Finally, Part V reviews the theories and research on the
causes of juvenile delinquency. Specifically, the role of parents in causing juvenile delinquency is reviewed and the conclusion is reached that there is no consensus among the experts on the causes of delinquency or the role that parents
play in it.
Although some evidence exists that parenting classes
may be useful in some cases to reduce juvenile delinquency,
parent training is not an all purpose tool for its control. Juvenile delinquency is a complex problem for which there are no
easy solutions: Punishing or training parents is not an effec-
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tive solution when bad parenting is not a significant cause of
the child's delinquency.
II.

THE FAILURE OF THE JUVENILE COURT AS

"PARENS PATRIAE"

The very concept of "juvenile delinquency" was unknown
at common law. Children under seven were presumed incapable of forming criminal intent and those over seven were, if
convicted of a crime, punished as adults.2 2
The first "juvenile court" was established in Illinois in
1899.23 It was established based on the premise that, where
the parents had failed in their duty to supervise and train
their child, the state should assume that role as parens patriae.2 4 The vision was that the judge, as a substitute wise
and caring parent, could provide the guidance the child had
lacked because of inadequate parenting.2 5
Rather than punishment (for either the parent or the
child), the goal of the juvenile court system was reform.2 6
The child was perceived as essentially good, and in need of
proper care and guidance. With such care and guidance, the
child would be reformed and the antisocial or criminal behavior would cease.2 7 Since the child was no longer being punished for committing a crime, he or she was no longer to be
stigmatized by the label "criminal". Acts which would have
been crimes if the perpetrator had been convicted as an adult
became acts of "juvenile delinquency". 28 The child was not
prosecuted for commission of a crime, so the safeguards of
procedural due process were deemed unnecessary. 29 The juvenile court proceedings determined whether the child was
22. See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967); M.A. BORTNER, DELINQUENCY
AND JUSTICE: AN AGE OF CRISIS, ch. 3 (1988). At common law, children could be
liable for civil tort damages, but often had no property from which such damages could be paid if awarded. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 123, at 913 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER ON

TORTS (5th ed.)].
23. See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14.
24. See id. at 16.

25. See id. at 26.
26. See M.A. BORTNER, supra note 22, at 47.

27. See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15; Gilbert Geis & Arnold Binder, Sins of
Their Children: Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Delinquency, 5 NOTR
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'y 303 n.2 (1991).
28. See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. at 22-24.
29. See id. at 17; M.A. BORTNER, supra note 22, at 44.
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placed on probation while remaining in the custody of his
parents (but under the supervision of a court probation officer), or removed from the parents' care and placed in a more
"wholesome" environment.3 0 Action by the court was theoretically designed to reform, not punish.3 1
Thus, at the inception of the juvenile court system in the
United States, the structure of that system was based upon a
belief that parenting affects a child's behavior, and that better parenting will reduce or eliminate juvenile delinquency.
However, the system focused on substituting the state's
agents (as parens patriae) for the child's parents, not on
changing the behavior of the child's own parents as a means
of eliminating juvenile delinquency in the child.
By the early 1960's all states had adopted a juvenile
court system based on the Illinois model.32 At that time,
sixty years after the juvenile court movement began, it was
clear that the early reformers' primary goal of rehabilitating
delinquent children was not being achieved. Instead,
although children were no longer being incarcerated with
adults in adult prison facilities, their detention in "reform
schools" and other facilities was conceded to be punitive, not
33
rehabilitative, in effect.

However, long before the recognition by the Supreme
Court in In Re Gault that the juvenile court system throughout the United States was woefully failing in its goal of rehabilitation, 34 statutes in various states had begun to focus directly on the "parent factor" in juvenile delinquency,
extending the limited common law parental liability for criminal law and tortious acts by children.3 5 Thus, although the
juvenile court system was focusing on the delinquent child,
parental responsibility for juvenile delinquency was a growing concern of the U.S. legal system.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

M.A. BORTNER, supra note 22, at 43-50.
See id.
See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14 & n.14.
See id. at 27.
See id. at 22.
See discussion infra Part III.
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PARENTAL LIABILITY LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED

STATES: DOES PUNISHING PARENTS REDUCE
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY?

Parental liability for the acts of minor children has taken
two forms under state legislation: vicarious tort liability and
criminal liability. 36 A review of the history of both tort and
criminal parental liability in the United States suggests that
as the disenchantment with the juvenile court system and its
apparent inability to reduce juvenile delinquency grew in the
1950's and 1960's, states in increasing numbers began enacting parental liability legislation.3" Although other rationales
could be offered for both tort and criminal parental liability
legislation, a review of selected cases supports the conclusion
that these laws were enacted as a means of reducing antisocial and criminal behavior by juveniles. 38 However, as discussed below, there is little evidence that these laws are hav39
ing the desired effect.
A. ParentalLiability for Tortious Acts of Minor Children:
An Effort to Reduce Juvenile Delinquency by the
Threat of Civil Damages
1. Common Law Limitations on Parental
Tort Liability
At common law, a parent generally could not be held liable for civil damages for the tortious acts of his or her minor
child.4 0 Exceptions allowed liability, but usually only upon a
showing of the parent's act or omission in certain circumstances, not merely because of the parent/child relationship. 4 For example, under general tort principles, a parent
could be held liable if she or he directed, encouraged or ratified the child's conduct. 42 Further, a parent could be held vicariously liable 43 if the child acted as his or her "agent" or
36. See discussion infra Parts III.A and III.B.
37. See discussion infra Parts III.A.2 and III.B.2.

38. See discussion infra Part III.A.3 and B.3.
39. See discussion infra Part III.B.4 and B.6.

40. See PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 22 § 123, at 913.
41. See id. at 913-14.
42. See id. at 914.

43. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1566 (6th Ed. 1990): "Vicarious liability.
The imposition of liability on one person for the actionable conduct of another,
based solely on a relationship between the two persons. Indirect or imputed
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"employee", and within the scope of such agency or
employment.4 4
Liability could be based on the negligence of the parent
her/himself. For example, the parent could be liable "like
anyone else" if the parent negligently entrusted a dangerous
instrumentality to a child,45 or entrusted a thing to a child
which was dangerous because of the particular "handicaps"
or "propensity" of that specific child.4 6
In addition, the parent had a special duty because of the
parent/child relationship in respect to the tortious acts of his
or her own child.4 7 The parent had a duty at common law to
reasonably control the conduct of his or her child for the protection of others. 48 However, the cases appear to limit liability to situations where the parent not only had notice of a
particular "dangerous tendency or proclivity" on the part of
his or her child, which in fact caused the injury, but also the
opportunity to prevent the injury by exercising reasonable
control over the child.4 9
Thus, where there was no foreseeability of the specific
tortious conduct which occurred because the parent had no
knowledge that the child had previously shown "tendencies"
toward such conduct, or where the parent had notice of such
"tendencies" but the injury occurred despite his or her exercise of reasonable control over the child, then the parent was
not liable at common law.50
The common law stopped short of holding a parent vicariously liable, in general, for the acts of his or her child, merely
because of the parent/child relationship. As the court stated
legal responsibility for acts of another, for example, the liability of an employer
for the acts of an employee, or, a principle for torts and contracts of an agent."
44. See PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 22 § 123, at 914.
45. Id.
46. Id.

For example, a gun is a "dangerous instrumentality". See id.

Matches or an automobile are given as examples of things which are not inherently dangerous, but which can be in the hands of a child. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 914-15.
49. See id. See, e.g., Emogene C. Wilhelm, Comment, Vicarious Parental
Liability in Connecticut:Is It Effective?, 7 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 99, 106-07 (1986)
and cases cited therein. If, for example, the parent, knowing of the child's
propensities for certain tortious conduct, did in fact make reasonable, good
faith efforts to control the child, he or she would not be liable for the child's
tortious act. See Wilhelm, supra at 107 n.47, citing Linder v. Bidner, 270
N.Y.S.2d 427 (1966).
50. PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 22 § 123, at 915.
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responsibility for the
in Linder v. Bidner, "there is no general
51
rearing of incorrigible children."
2.

Statutory Extension of Parental Vicarious Tort
Liability for the Acts of Minor Children

However, the limited common law liability of parents for
their children's tortious acts has been extended by statute in
almost all states.5 2 The first U.S. jurisdictions to adopt some
form of tort parental liability were states (Hawaii and Louisiana) with statutory systems based on civil law, not common
law. 5 3 Unlike common law, civil law has traditionally allowed parental vicarious liability for the tortious acts of
minors.5 4
Other jurisdictions did not quickly follow suit. It was not
until 1951 that another state, Nebraska, enacted a parental
tort liability statute.5 5 From 1951 through the 1960's, the
number of states which enacted parental tort liability statutes increased dramatically. 56 At least one author has suggested that these statutes were enacted as a direct result of
the increase in juvenile delinquency throughout the United
States during this period, in an effort to curb it. 57 By the late
1980's, all states but New Hampshire had enacted some form
of parental tort liability statute.5"
51. Linder, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 430. In the Linder case, the court found that
the complaint stated a cause of action against the parents where it alleged they
were aware of their son's habit of "mauling, pummeling, assaulting and mistreating smaller children," and further alleged that the parents did not exercise
reasonable control over their son to prevent such conduct, where they had the
opportunity to exercise such control. Id.
52. PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 22 § 123, at 913 (footnote omitted); L. Wayne Scott, Liability of Parentsfor Conduct of Their Child under Section 33.01 of the Texas Family Code: Defining the Requisite Standardsof "Culpability", 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 69 at app. (1988).
53. Geis & Binder, supra note 27, at 307 nn.20-22, citing HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 577-3 (1988) and L.A. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (West 1979, Supp. 1990).
54. See PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 22 § 123, at 913.
55. Geis & Binder, supra note 27, at 310 & n.39.
56. See Scott, supra note 52, at app. According to the appendix in Scott's
article, 33 states enacted parental tort liability statutes from 1951-1969. See
id.
57. See Richard G. Kent, Parental Liability for the Torts of Children, 50
CONN.B.J. 452, 465 (1976), cited in Wilhelm, supra note 49, at 109.
58. See Scott, supra note 52, at app. (noting that 49 states had parental tort
liability statutes as of 1987). The tort liability of parents for the tortious acts of
their children has generally survived constitutional attack where it has been
challenged. See PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 22 § 123, at 913. In
Corley v. Lewless, 182 S.E.2d 766 (Ga. 1971), the court held that Georgia's vica-
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Almost all of the statutory parental tort liability laws require more than mere negligence on the part of the child for
the parent to be held liable.5 9 Words such as "willful", "malicious", "delinquent", "intentional" and "reckless" have been
used to describe the child's necessary state of mind.6 °
But in contrast to the common law approach, parental
liability under these acts is almost always vicarious liability
based solely on the parent/child relationship. 6 ' No intentional or negligent act or omission by the parent must be
proven to establish liability.6 2
Although some of the earlier statutes placed no monetary
limits on recovery,6 3 according to surveys done in the late
1980's, all jurisdictions with statutory parental tort liability
laws now place significant restrictions on the amount of recovery allowed.6 4 As of 1988, according to one commentator,
statutory limits ranged from $15,000 (Texas) to $250 (Vermont), with an average of $2,500.65
3.

The Rationale Behind Vicarious Parental Tort
Liability Statutes: Reduction of Juvenile
Delinquency

The limits on recovery suggest that the legislative intent
in enacting these parental liability statutes allowing tort recovery is not primarily to compensate the victims; if it were,
there would be no reason to statutorily restrict the recovery
rious parental tort liability statute was unconstitutional where parental liability for damages was unlimited in terms of the amount of recovery allowed. The
legislature later amended the statute, providing for limited recovery (as most
state statutes do). See Hayward v. Ramick, 285 S.E.2d 697, 698 (Ga. 1982).
59. See Scott, supra note 52, at app.
60. See PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 22 § 123, at 913; see also
Scott, supra note 52, at app. Scott argues that in the Texas statute the words
'willful" and "malicious" should be interpreted as meaning "grossly negligent",
not "intentional". See id. at 78.
61. See discussion infra at Part III.A.1. At common law, a parent could be
held vicariously liable in tort for the acts of his or her child, but the basis for
vicarious liability was an employer/employee or principle/agent relationship,
not the parent/child relationship.
62. PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 22 § 123, at 913.
63. See Geis & Binder, supra note 27, at 311 & n.46.
64. See Geis & Binder, supra note 27, at 311 n.47, citing Scott, supra note
52, at app. (analyzing the information in Scott's appendix). More than half of
the statutes allow recovery for both personal injury and property damage, while
the rest allow recovery for property damage only. See Wilhelm, supra note 49,
at 121-24, cited in Geis & Binder, supra note 27, at 310 n.41.
65. See Scott, supra note 52, at app.
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which the common law has historically allowed victims of tortious acts.66
Although almost every jurisdiction has adopted parental
tort liability statutes, there have not been many reported
cases. A review of the rationale for the legislation, as discussed by the court in some of these cases, confirms that compensation of the victim is not the only, or even the primary,
6
Instead,
motivation behind the adoption of these statutes.
of
enactment
the
for
cases
the rationale which is given in the
these statutes is primarily the reduction of juvenile delinquency; it is presumed that the threat of civil damages will
encourage parents to better supervise their children, and that
better supervision of children will reduce juvenile tortious
acts.68
For example, in General Insurance Company of America
6 9 the insurance company had sued the parents of
v. Faulkner,
an eleven year old boy as subrogee of their insured, a
school. 70 The boy was alleged to have "maliciously and willfully" set fire to curtains in the school auditorium, resulting
in damages of nearly $3,000, which the insurance company
had7 1paid to the school under the terms of the insurance policy. The insurance company sought to recover $500 (the liability limit) from the parents, jointly and severally, under the
7 2 Defendant parents
state's parental tort liability statute.
had challenged the complaint on constitutional and other
78
grounds, and the lower court had dismissed the action.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina found
the statute was constitutional, and did not deprive the parents of their property without due process of law under the
state constitution.7 4 It further found that the complaint did
not need to allege facts showing any act or omission by the
66. See Geis & Binder, supra note 27, at 311.
67. See discussion infra notes 69-89.
68. See discussion infra notes 69-89.
69. 130 S.E.2d 645 (N.C. 1963).
70. Id at 646-47.
71. Id. at 647.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 650. The parents did not effectively raise a federal constitutional
issue, because they erroneously relied on the 5th Amendment and not the 14th
Amendment for their constitutional claim; the court held that the 5th Amendment did not apply to limit state action. See id.
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parents, since the state imposed vicarious liability upon them
75
for the acts of their child.
In its decision, the court mentioned the trend in the
United States toward expanding the common law liability of
parents, and discussed the rationale behind the vicarious parental liability statutes adopted in North Carolina and other
states:
[The North Carolina statute], and similar statutes, appear to have been adopted not out of consideration for providing a restorative compensation for the victims of injurious or tortious conduct of children, but as an aid in the
control of juvenile delinquency .... [The North Carolina
statute's] rationale apparently is that parental indifference and failure to supervise the activities of children is
one of the major causes of juvenile delinquency; that parental liability for harm done by children will stimulate
attention and supervision; and that the total effect will6 be
7
the reduction in the anti-social behavior of children.
In Hayward v. Ramick,7 7 the Supreme Court of Georgia
held that the vicarious parental liability statute adopted by
Georgia in 197678 was constitutional, against a claim by the
parents that the statute violated the substantive due process
clauses of both the federal and state constitutions because it
imposed vicarious liability upon them for the acts of their
child. In that case, the complaint alleged that the appellant/
defendants' sons had burglarized appellee/plaintiffs home,
causing property damage. At trial, the jury had found in
favor of plaintiff, awarding damages against the boys, and
also against each parent under the parental liability
statute.7 9
The court on appeal affirmed and found that the "express
intent" of the statute was to aid in controlling delinquency,
75. Id.
76. General Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 130 S.E.2d 645, 650 (N.C. 1963).

77. 285 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
78. The 1976 version of the Georgia statute stated, in part: "[Elvery parent
... having in custody and control over a minor child or children under the age of
18 shall be liable in an amount not to exceed Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) for
the willful or malicious acts of said minor child or children resulting in damage
to the property of another...." Id. at 698, citing Georgia Parental Liability for
Minor Children's Torts Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-13 (1976).
79. See Hayward, 285 S.E.2d 697.
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not to compensate victims for the acts of children. 0 Applying
a rational basis test, the court held that the statute was not
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious; that it was rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose; and that it therefore did not violate substantive due process: "We further hold
that the state has a legitimate interest in the subject (controlling juvenile delinquency), and that there is a rational relationship between the means used (imposing of liability upon
parents of children who willfully or maliciously damage property) and this object [sic].""1
In a Connecticut case, Watson v. Gradzik, 2 which upheld
the constitutionality of that state's vicarious parental tort liability statute, the court stated that the rationale behind the
statute was both to control juvenile delinquency and to compensate victims of damages caused by minors.8 3 In Watson,
plaintiff had brought suit against the parents of a minor for
wrongful conversion. The parents demurred on the ground
that the vicarious parental liability statute was
unconstitutional.8 4
The parents claimed that imposition of vicarious tort liability upon them interfered with their fundamental right to
bear and raise children.8 5 The court reasoned that because
parents in Connecticut have the authority, by case law, to
compel their children's obedience "in all matters," 86 "it would
not seem unreasonable to hold them responsible for exercising that authority".8 7
The court further found that the parents had not met
their burden of proving that the statute was not reasonably
related to the dual purposes of controlling juvenile delin80. See id. The statute under scrutiny was enacted in 1976. A prior vicarious parental liability statute had previously been held unconstitutional, in part
because the Georgia court felt that if the statute was compensatory in nature
(there were no liability limits), it violated substantive due process; that case
hinted that if the recovery was limited and in the nature of a penalty, there
would not be a constitutional problem. See id., citing Corley v. Lewless, 182
S.E.2d 766 (Ga. 1971). The court in Hayward suggested that the expression of
legislative intent was to comply with standards developed in the Corley case.
See Hayward, 285 S.E.2d at 697.
81. Hayward, 285 S.E.2d at 699.
82. 373 A.2d 191 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977).
83. See id. at 193.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 192.
86. Id., quoting State v. Hughes, 209 A.2d 872, 879 (1965).
87. Id. at 192.
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quency and compensating the victims of child tortfeasors 8s
Without discussion of the evidence which the parents might
have offered to meet their burden of proof, the court commented that similar statutes had been held constitutional in
many jurisdictions.8 9 It quoted with approval from law review articles cited by courts of other states which argued that
the use of vicarious parental liability statutes to compensate
innocent victims of children's torts was fair and reasonable,
either because the parents might be at least in part responsible for the child's act, or because, even if entirely without
fault, it was more fair to have the parents bear the loss than
an innocent tort victim. 90
As to the second alleged purpose of the Connecticut statute-that of controlling juvenile delinquency-the court gave
only its bare conclusion, without discussion or analysis, that
the statute bore a rational relationship to a legitimate public
purpose. 9 ' Interestingly, the court did not explore the available legislative history, which clearly indicated that a major
factor in adopting the Connecticut statute was the reduction
92
of juvenile delinquency.
As these examples suggest, a significant, if not primary,
reason for the vicarious parental tort liability statutes appears to be the reduction of juvenile delinquency by making
88. See Watson v. Gradzik, 373 A.2d 191 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977).
89. See id. at 192.
90. See id. at 193, citing General Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, citing Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434, 437-38 (Tex. Cir. App. 1961), quoting Burchard V. Martin, Comment, Parent& Child-Civil Responsibility of Parents for the Torts of
Children-StatutoryImposition of Strict Liability, 3 VILL. L. REV. 529 (1958).
91. See Watson v. Gradzik, 373 A.2d at 193.
92. See id. at 193. Statements by the state senators in the hearings on Connecticut's vicarious liability statute before it was adopted in 1955 are revealing.
One legislator stated: "Ibelieve that such a bill will make the parents more
alert and give a little bit more attention and a little bit more supervision in
upbring [sic] their children." Wilhelm, supra note 49, at 111 n.68, citing Liability of Parentsfor Damage by Children:Hearings on Cal. 545 Sub. for H.B. No.
71, 1955 Sess. 978 (Conn. 1955).
Another said:
I don't think there is such a thing as juvenile delinquency. I think
there is only adult delinquency. It is appalling how parents completely
neglect their children and the problem children that come in and are
branded as juvenile delinquents . . . . This bill . . . is merely an attempt to get at this adult delinquency. . .. I would like to approach
juvenile delinquency by putting the finger where it belongs and that is
on the parents. . . who should be responsible.
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parents responsible for their children's acts, not the compensation of the victims, nor the punishment of the parents.
4. Has Imposing Parental Tort Liability Resulted in a
Reduction in Juvenile Delinquency?
Interestingly, despite the consistent rationale for enacting and enforcing parental tort liability statutes as a means
of reducing juvenile delinquency, there is little evidence that
the enactment of such legislation has, in fact, resulted in the
reduction of juvenile delinquency. Only one study has been
found which even addresses this question; it suggests the enactment of parental liability statutes does not result in a reduction in juvenile delinquency.93 This study has been criticized as being significantly flawed in its structure and
analysis.94 Certainly, the alternative rationale of requiring
parents, as opposed to third party victims, to absorb the loss
caused by the delinquent acts of children appears justifiable
upon public policy grounds.95 However, since most of the
statutes do not provide for recovery based upon the damages
proved, the victim may be achieving only a symbolic victory,
unless the actual damages are within the restricted statutory
limits.
Thus, the main purpose of parental tort liability statutes
appears to be the reduction of juvenile delinquency. However, it is clear that under these statutes tort liability of a
parent is not based on the parent's knowledge or action, but
only on the existence of the parent-child relationship (where
the child is in the custody of the parent). Liability is therefore imposed upon parents, essentially presuming that they
have the ability to control their child and prevent the delinquent acts, but have failed to do so. This analysis implies
that there is a universally applicable model of parental supervision and control which, if utilized by the parent, will result
in a reduction or elimination of juvenile delinquent acts by
the child. It further ignores the possibility that other factors
93. See Wilhelm, supranote 49, at 137-38. Actually, the "study" was of data
available from the Federal Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare analyzed by
Alice B. Freer in her Law review article ParentalLiability for Torts of Children,
53 Ky. L. J. 255, 264-65 (1965).
94. See id.
95. See id. at 114.
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besides parental supervision and control may, in fact, be the
most significant causes of the child's behavior.
What if the child is effectively beyond the parent's control, for whatever reason, even if living with that parent and
legally in the parent's custody? As to vicarious tort parental
liability, the answer may be that even if juvenile delinquency
is not being controlled by imposing parental tort liability,
holding the parent financially responsible at least partially
compensates an innocent victim of the child's acts. The compensation of the victim does not, however, explain the imposition upon parents of criminal liability related to their children's delinquency. For criminal liability to be imposed, the
parent's own intent and action or failure to act are critical;
but the rationale of controlling juvenile liability by punishing
the parent (this time with criminal sanctions) appears consistent with the tort liability statutes.
B. ParentalLiability for Status Offenses and "Criminal"
Acts of Juvenile Delinquency: An Effort to Reduce
Juvenile Delinquency by Criminal Punishment
Statutory criminal liability in connection with a child's
juvenile delinquency is only imposed upon parents where the
parent is proved to have had the requisite criminal intent and
to have "caused" the child's delinquent act. 96 Thus, the connection between the parent's poor parenting and the child's
delinquent act must be established before the parent can be
convicted under the criminal liability laws, unlike the vicarious tort liability statutes.
1. Common Law Limited Criminal Liability
for Parents
At common law, parents were not responsible for the independent criminal acts of their children. Only if the children were found to have acted as "agents" for the parents
(making the parents principals), could the parents be
97

prosecuted.

96. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
97. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Keenan, 25 N.E. 32 (Mass. 1890) (conviction
of father reversed where evidence showed son did not sell liquor at his direction); Commonwealth v. Slavski, 140 N.E. 465 (Mass. 1923) (conviction of father
affirmed where evidence showed son sold liquor in home "under control" of fa-
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Statutory Expansion of ParentalCriminal Liability

State statutory laws in many jurisdictions have expanded the criminal liability of parents for their children's
acts. Unlike the parental tort liability statutes, where a parent is typically made vicariously liable for his or her child's
intentional or reckless acts merely because of the parent/
child relationship, the criminal statutes either on their face
or by judicial interpretation typically require the element of
99
mens rea (criminal intent)9 or criminal negligence by the
parent, and further require that the parent's act or failure to
1
act be a proximate cause' °° of the child's act.'
Although various states have enacted specific statutes
making parents criminally liable where their children commit acts of juvenile delinquency while operating a vehicle, in
02
possession of a firearm, or in other specific situations,' the
discussion below is limited to the most common types of statutes or ordinances which impose criminal liability upon a
parent in connection with the juvenile delinquency of his or
her child.
The first two categories, truancy and curfew laws, generally impose criminal liability on a parent who knowingly allows his or her child to commit acts (staying out past an established curfew; not attending school) which would not be
criminal if committed by an adult. 10 3 As to the child, truancy
and curfew violations are generally termed "status offenses,"
because the child can be brought before the juvenile court and
adjudged delinquent for these acts, whereas there would be
no chargeable offense at all if the child were an adult; prose10 4
cution is based solely upon the child's "status" as a minor.
ther); State v. Leonard, 41 Vt. 585 (1869) (father convicted of burglary where
children did acts at his direction).
98. See generally ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW
826-40 (3rd ed. 1982).
99. Id. at 840-51.
100. Id. at 774-85.
101. See, e.g., Seleina v. Seleina, 93 N.Y.S.2d 42 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1949)
("contributing" statute); McCollester V. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046 (N.H.
1981) (curfew); In Re Jeanette L., 523 A.2d 1048 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987)
(truancy).
102. See generally Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, CriminalResponsibility of Parentfor Act of Child, 12 A.L.R. 4TH 633-700 (1994).
103. See infra Part III.B.3-4.
104. See ARNOLD BINDER, GILBERT GEIS & DICKSON BRUCE, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 9, 532-39 (1988).
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The third category of laws discussed below, under which
parental criminal liability can be incurred in connection with
the juvenile delinquency of a child, are the so-called "contributing" statutes. 1°5 These are the laws, enacted in virtually
every jurisdiction in the United States, which make adults
(including parents) criminally liable for contributing to the
delinquency of a minor. 106
Finally, the recent trend toward broad local ordinances
which impose criminal (and sometimes civil) liability upon
parents for a variety of acts by their children, is discussed. 10 7
The analysis below of the criminal parental liability imposed
under truancy laws, curfew ordinances, "contributing" statutes, and recently enacted local parental liability ordinances
indicates that, like the tort liability statutes, a primary purpose of these laws has been to control juvenile delinquency by
punishing, or threatening to punish, parents for the juvenile
delinquency of their children.10
3.

Truancy Laws: ParentalLiability for the Purpose of
Controllinga Child's Truancy
State compulsory school attendance laws, which typically
include provisions that punish parents, guardians or others
having custody and control of a child for that child's failure to
attend school, had been enacted in at least some states by the
1920's,1 ° 9 and have generally been upheld as
constitutional. 10
The United States Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters"' found that an Oregon truancy statute requiring all
children to attend public schools was unconstitutional, but
the court confirmed the power of the state to require children
to attend school, generally: "No question is raised concerning
the power of the state reasonably to regulate all schools, to
inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and
105. See infra Part III.B.5.
106. See infra Part III.B.5.
107. See infra Part III.B.6.
108. See infra Part III.B.3-5.
109. See, e.g.,. State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730 (Ind.1901); State v. Hoyt, 146 A.
170 (N.H. 1929); Parr v. State, 157 N.E. 555 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. Ohio 1927);
State v. Williams, 228 N.W. 470 (S.D. 1929).
110. See, e.g., People v. Turner, 263 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1953), appeal dismissed,
347 U.S. 972 (1953); State v. Hoyt, 146 A. 170 (N.H. 1929); Stephens v. Bongart,
189 A. 131 (N.J. 1937); Williams, 228 N.W. 470; Parr, 157 N.E. 555.
111. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some
school ...."112
Emphasizing the importance of the parent's role in directing the child's education, the Supreme Court in Pierce
stated: "The child is not the mere creature of the state: those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." l1 3 Since truancy statutes have uniformly been upheld as constitutional where the state
provided for some alternative to public schooling, the courts
have typically summarily disposed of any constitutional
attacks. 114
The wording of the state statutes typically only makes
the parent or guardian responsible where the child is under
his or her "custody" and/or "control."1 15 This makes sense,
since criminally liability can only be imposed where the parent's actions (or failure to act) are found to have been a proximate cause of the child's delinquent act, which could not be
the case if the child was not found to be "under" that parent's
custody and control. In fact, most of the reported cases appear to be cases where the child's truancy was not just passively tolerated, but was actively encouraged, by the parent,
who was found to have kept the child home from school,
either for religious reasons, 1 16 or because the parent claimed

112. Id. at 534 (emphasis added), quoted with approval in People v. Turner,
263 P.2d 685, 687 (Cal. 1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1953).
113. Id. at 535, quoted with approval in State v. Williams, 228 N.W. 470,
471 (S.D. 1929).
114. See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730 (Ind.1901); Stephens v. Bongart,
189 A. 131 (N.J. 1937); Williams, 228 N.W. 470.
115. See, e.g., Williams, 228 N.W. 470 (quoting the North Dakota truancy
statute as stating: "Every person having under his control a child of the age of
eight years and not exceeding the age of seventeen years, shall annually cause
such child to regularly attend some

. .

.

school .

.

. .");

Bongart, 189 A. 131

(quoting the New Jersey truancy statute as stating: "Every parent, guardian or
other person having custody and control of a child between the ages of seven
and sixteen years shall cause such child regularly to attend the public schools.
. .or to attend a day school . . . or to receive equivalent instruction elsewhere
that at school . . .).
116. See, e.g., cases cited in Eichelberger, supra note 102, at 686-90. In Wisconsin v.Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Supreme Court held that Amish parents were not required to send their children to school until 16 years of age
where to do so conflicted with the First Amendment free exercise of religion
clause.
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to be schooling the child at home (often because of religious
117
convictions).
In the reported cases which have either considered the
constitutionality of truancy statutes which impose parental
criminal liability for the child's truancy, or which have applied such statutes to prosecute parents, the courts generally
do not discuss the legislative rationale behind the parental
liability provision.'
However, the general emphasis given
in the cases to the parent's duty to educate her or his child,
and to the state's power to compel such education, leads inevitably to the conclusion that the rationale behind these laws
imposing criminal liability upon a parent for truancy by his
or her child is not retributive. The rationale is to deter truancy by punishing (or threatening to punish) a parent who
does not make his or her child go to school.
One case which does explicitly address the rationale behind the criminal parental liability section of a truancy statute is People v. Turner." 9 In that case, defendants had been
convicted for failing to send their three children to school.' 2 0
They appealed, claiming that the statute unconstitutionally
deprived them of the their right "to how and where their children may be educated."' 2 1 The court held that the statute
was constitutional, and that the state acted within its powers
in regulating private schooling as an alternative to public
schooling, commenting that its review of the cases in other
states did not discover any case where a compulsory attendance statute was held unconstitutional for failing to recognize
home instruction as an alternative to attendance in the public schools.' 2 2
In Turner, home instruction was allowed under the statute, but the parents had not met the statutory requirements
for home instruction; in particular, that the private tutor
have a state teaching certificate.123 The court held that such
117. See, e.g., Bongart, 189 A. 131; People v. Turner, 263 P.2d 685 (Cal.
1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1953); see also Eichelberger supra note
102, at 688, 690-91, 693-95.
118. See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730 (Ind.1901); State v. Hoyt, 146 A.
170 (N.H. 1929); Parr v. State, 157 N.E. 555 (Ohio 1927); Williams, 228 N.W.
470.
119. 263 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1953).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 687.
122. See id. at 688.
123. See id.
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12 4
Discussing the
statutory requirements were reasonable.
rationale for the truancy statute, the court stated: "While the
ultimate object of the statute is the education of the child,
means to assure the attainment of that end may be adopted by
imposition of penalties
the state, and may be enforced by the
1 25
made."
regulations
the
violating
for
Only one reported case has been found where the parent
claimed that she did not have "control" over the child. In that
case, In Re JeannetteL., 126 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals discussed the rationale behind the parental liability
provision of the state's compulsory school attendance statute
in reviewing the conviction in the juvenile court 127of two
truancy.
mothers accused of causing their children's
In its statement of facts, the appellate court stated that
one of the appellants had testified "that the reason for the
daughters' nonattendance at school were her state of health,
lack of cooperation from her children, and her inability to
control their conduct."' 2 s In addition, that appellant had
claimed her daughters were often sick, and that she had no
and so could not pick them up early from
transportation
12 9
school.
The appellant mothers had been convicted after jury tri130
Their appeal was based on
als, which they had requested.
several grounds, including the unconstitutionality of the
Maryland truancy law, and the insufficiency of the evidence. 13 ' Holding that the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague, the court specifically held that the statute did not attempt to impose strict liability on parents for their children's
truancy:
The statute does not subject a parent to prosecution
for the actions of his or her children, but it does sanction
prosecution for the parent's own acts. Before a person
may be found guilty of violating [the truancy statute], the
court must find: 1) the person had control over the child

124. See id. at 688-89.
125. People v. Turner, 263 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1953) (emphasis added), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1953).
126. 523 A.2d 1048 (Md. 1987).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1050.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 1050.
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and 2) failed to see that the child attended school
regularly.
The statute imposes an affirmative duty on persons
who have control over a child ....That duty is to assure
that the child attends school regularly. Failure to perform
that duty is a violation of the statute. Passive acquiescence in the child's nonattendance of school is no

defense. 132
The court upheld the mothers' convictions under the Maryland truancy law: the jury at trial apparently had not believed the one defendant's claim that her children were beyond her control.133
However, it is not difficult to imagine a situation where a
teenager, still a minor and in the legal custody of his or her
parent, is in fact beyond the control of the parent, although
the parent knows or suspects the child is skipping school. In
that case, one might ask, what actions does the parent have
to take to avoid "passive acquiescence" in the truancy which
might subject that parent to criminal liability?
For example, if the parent's child is a sixteen year old
who habitually disobeys the parent and may even be physically abusive to the parent, what acts could the parent do to
show he or she has attempted to exercise control over the
child and failed?13 1 What if, as one of the mothers in In Re
Jeanette L. claimed, the parent does not have adequate transportation to give her flexibility in taking or picking up a sick
child from school, perhaps for economic reasons? Similar
questions regarding the usefulness of parental liability laws
in controlling juvenile acts may arise regarding the criminal
liability of a parent for the curfew violations by his or her
child, as discussed below.
132. In Re Jeannette L., 523 A.2d at 1055.
133. See id. at 1051.
134. See, e.g., Ann Landers, Some Kids Just Can't Be Controlled, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 1996, at E5R, where a parent wrote in a letter to the columnist:
It may seem unbelievable, Ann, but some children simply cannot be
controlled. We had a daughter whom we sent off to school in the morning, but she never got there. Instead, she joined her boyfriend ....
I cannot tell you how many people we turned to for help with this problem. Finally, two kind, understanding school counselors told us there
was nothing we could do. What good would it have done to put us into
jail? The boyfriend's mother had the same problem. Her son would
have liked nothing better than to see her locked up because of his
truancy.
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Curfew Laws: ParentalLiability for the Purpose of
Controlling a Child's Curfew Violations

Curfew laws typically provide that it is unlawful for certain persons (often limited to minors, or minors of specific
ages) to be in certain places (for example, the public streets
and public buildings) at night, without being accompanied by
a parent, guardian or other responsible adult, or without a
reasonable excuse. 13 5 These laws are typically enacted by
municipalities as local ordinances and not by the state as
statutes.' 3 6 Curfews imposed upon juveniles gained popularity in the United States beginning in the late nineteenth century: by the late 1950's about 48 cities with populations over
100,000 were found not only to have such ordinances, but also
to be enforcing them."8 7
Most curfew ordinances impose parental responsibility
for the child's compliance with the curfew. 138 There appear to
be only a handful of reported cases dealing with criminal pa1 39
As in
rental liability imposed under curfew ordinances.
scruticourts
most of the decisions in the truancy cases, the
nizing parental liability under the curfew laws do not discuss
the rationale for punishing the parents of minors violating
curfews, except indirectly in the discussion of the rationale
for the curfew laws, generally.
For example, in People v. Walton,140 the district attorney
appealed the dismissal of a complaint against a father
charged with having allowed his sixteen year old son to violate the curfew ordinances.' 4 ' The lower court had dismissed
the complaint, finding that the curfew ordinances in question
135. See, e.g., People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498 (Cal. 1945); Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 22 N.E.2d 126 (Ct. App. Ohio 1966). However, at least one city in Orange
County, California, has enacted curfew ordinances which restrict children's
movements during the daytime. See Cathy Werblin, Seal Beach Daytime Curfew Approved, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1996, at B5A.
136. Ruggiero, 220 N.E.2d 126.
137. See id. at 127-28. Nine jurisdictions apparently had curfew ordinances,
but were not enforcing them. See id.
138. See id. at 128.
139. See, e.g., McCollester v. City of Keene, N.H., 514 F. Supp. 1046 (N.H.
1981); People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1945); Ruggiero, 220 N.E.2d 126.
140. 161 P.2d 498 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1945).
141. See id. at 499-500.
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violated both the state and federal constitutions and were
void. 142
On appeal, the court in Walton found that the defendant
father only had standing to attack the provisions of the ordinances which imposed criminal liability upon a parent who
allowed or permitted her or his minor child to violate the curfew law. Considering those provisions only, the court held
that they were constitutional. The court stated: "[Ilt is well
settled that minors constitute a class founded upon a natural
and intrinsic distinction from adults; that legislation peculiarly applicable to them is necessary for their proper protection and when induced by rational considerations looking to
that end its validity may not be challenged." 43
The court offered no additional rationale for the imposition upon a parent of criminal liability for the curfew violation by his or her child: it can be inferred that the court considered such punishment not as retributive, but as part of a
rational scheme by the legislature for the "proper protection"
of minors.1 4 Thus, the reason parents are punished appears
to be to encourage them to control or supervise their children
adequately, so that curfew violations will not occur.
In another case, City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero,145 a curfew
ordinance which contained a provision imposing criminal parental liability was challenged upon constitutional grounds
"because it is unduly restrictive of personal freedoms."' 46 In
holding the ordinance constitutional, the court stated:
We feel that curfew ordinances for minors are justified as
necessary police regulations to control the presence of
juveniles in public places at nighttime with the attendant
risk of mischief, and that such ordinances promote the
safety and good order of the community by reducing the
incidence of juvenile criminal activity. 147
In Eastlake, as in Walton, the court's opinion did not articulate a distinct rationale for the criminal parentalliability
portion of the curfew ordinance; the rationale given for the
curfew ordinance in its entirety (including the parental liabil142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See id. at 499.
Id. at 501.
See id.
220 N.E.2d 126 (Ohio 1966).
Id. at 127.
Id. at 128.
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ity provision) was to prevent juvenile "mischief' and juvenile
criminal activity at night. 148 The parental liability provision
in this curfew ordinance supports the rationale of preventing
juvenile "mischief' only if the assumption is made that appropriate parental control of a child will stop the curfew violations by that child. In upholding the constitutionality of the
parental liability provision in the curfew ordinance, the court
in Eastlake must have made this assumption, although its
opinion does not articulate it.
Finally, in McCollester v. City of Keene,'1 49 a case which
held a curfew ordinance to be an unconstitutional restriction
of the liberty interest of minors, 150 the court discussed the
legislative intent behind the enactment of the ordinance:
Although antisocial activity was the purpose of adopting
the ordinance stated in the preamble [of the ordinance]... , there are indications in the record that the
safety and general welfare of vulnerable, impressionable
minors was an unstated purpose in the minds of several of
the legislators when the ordinance was being

considered. 151
In McCollester,the rationale behind the provision providing for parental criminal liability was not specifically addressed by the adopting legislators, either in their written
preamble to the ordinance itself or in their affidavits submitted to the trial court.15 2 Presumably then, the reason for imposing criminal liability upon a parent for his or her child's
curfew violation was the same reason given for adoption of
the curfew ordinance generally: preventing antisocial activity
and protecting minors.
Thus, the parental liability provisions of the curfew laws,
like those provisions of the truancy laws, appear to have been
enacted for the purpose of reducing juvenile delinquency by
punishing, or threatening to punish, parents who do not effectively control their children. This rationale in turn presumes
that parents generally will have the ability and means to control their children, particularly adolescent children, who
otherwise might violate the curfew.
148. Id.
149. 514 F. Supp. 1046 (N.H. 1981).
150. See id. at 1053.
151. Id. at 1050, referring to certain affidavits attached to the defendant's
opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
152. See McCollester, 514 F. Supp. 1046.
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5. ContributingStatutes: ParentalLiability for the
Purpose of ControllingOther Acts of Juvenile
Delinquency
The first state to enact a statute which in general terms
made it a crime to contribute to the delinquency of a minor
was Colorado, in 1903.153 Other states soon followed suit."'
By 1961, one author claimed 48 states had "contributing"
statutes.' 55 In 1983, another author claimed 42 states had
156
"contributing" statutes.

In contrast to the truancy and curfew laws, so-called
"contributing" statutes do not limit the class of persons who
can be charged and convicted to the parent, guardian of a minor child, or other person having custody and control of the
child; any adult is subject to the law. In fact, to the layperson
the phrase "contributing to the delinquency of a minor" is
most likely to suggest an adult enticing an unrelated minor
into committing illegal acts (sex, use of drugs, use of alcohol,
stealing, etc.), not deficient parenting.
In the few cases where parents have actually been prosecuted for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and the
case has been reported, the courts have not addressed the relationship between parenting and the child's delinquency in
any detailed way.1 57 However, these cases do suggest that
the main purpose of the contributing statutes is the reduction
of juvenile delinquency.15 Punishing parents and others is
thus presumed to have a deterrent affect on the actions of
those persons, where they have "caused" the child's delinquency, or, in some statutes, the child's "tendency" to become
delinquent.
153. See James A. Kenny & James V. Kenny, Shall We Punish the Parents?,
47 A.B.A. J. 804, 805 (Aug. 1961).
154. See, e.g., Mill v. Brown, 88 P. 609 (Utah 1907) (holding part of Utah
contributing statute unconstitutional which based parental liability on juvenile
offender status of the child without more); People v. De Leon, 170 P. 173 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1918), reh'g denied, Jan. 31, 1918 (upholding conviction under
contributing statute of nonparent cafe manager for serving liquor to a minor).
155. See Kenny & Kenny, supra note 153, at 805.
156. See Geis & Binder, supra note 27, citing Peter D. Garlock, Contributing
to the Delinquency of Minors, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 240 (S. Kadish, ed. 1983).
157. See discussion infra notes 159-70.
158. See discussion infra notes 159-70.
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For example, in State v. Gans,'5 9 defendants were the
adoptive parents of a minor (laughter, age eleven. They had
transported her from Ohio to West Virginia, and there consented to her marriage, and consented to her misrepresentation of her age in securing a marriage license. 160 After a jury
trial, they had been found guilty of contributing to the delinquency of their daughter, and appealed.161 On appeal, the
court conceded that the daughter had not been adjudicated a
delinquent child: however, under the Ohio statute, a person
could be prosecuted for acting "in a way tending to cause
delinquency."162
After admitting that the validity of the child's marriage
was not at issue, the court proceeded with a lengthy discussion of the public policy considerations in Ohio against marriages by minor females under sixteen years of age.' 6 3 It then
hypothesized that because of her responsibilities as a homemaker and wife, the girl might not attend school as required
by Ohio's compulsory attendance law. 1 64 It then concluded
that the jury could, on the basis of the evidence before it, conclude that the parents' acts in facilitating their daughter's
65
marriage would tend to cause her to become a delinquent.
Regarding the rationale behind the contributing statute,
particularly the clause allowing the prosecution of persons for
contributing to the delinquency of a child who had not been
found to be delinquent, the court stated:
It is apparent that the purpose of that clause is to prevent
a delinquency before it occurs rather than to await such
delinquency and then punish the adult offender. The purpose of the clause is to avoid the undesirable result which
might arise if an adult is permitted to pursue a course of
conduct which tends to cause a child to become a delinA
quent. It is the old theory of preventative medicine.
16 6
cure.
to
than
prevent
to
easier
much
is
disease
One reported contributing case at the trial court level offers some interesting insights into the reasoning of a trial
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

151 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio 1958).
See id at 711.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 711-13.
See id. at 713-14.
See State v. Gans, 151 N.E.2d at 714.
Id. at 710.
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judge regarding the purposes of a specific contributing statute as applied to a parent, and the general connection between parenting and juvenile delinquency. In Seleina v.
Seleina,16 7 a 1949 New York case where the trial decision was
reported, a mother had alleged that her husband had contributed to the delinquency of their eleven year old minor daughter by encouraging the daughter to disobey the mother. The
trial court found that the daughter was delinquent, in that
she had become aggressive, showed disrespect for her mother
and other adults, had stayed away from her home for one and
a half days, and had stolen money on several occasions.16 s
The court in its opinion, discussed the judge's personal opinion regarding the causes of juvenile delinquency:
I am grateful that these [delinquent] children are not
regarded as criminals. They are just offenders who are to
be helped to become decent human beings. I have yet to
find, except in very rare instances, that children had become delinquent because of any reason other than neglect
either by the schools, by the churches, by the community,
or as in most instances, by the parents ....Punishment
does act as a deterrent. As to that there can be no doubt
....In this instance I think the man [the convicted father] ought to be removed from the community for some
time. Possibly such confinement might help him to realize
his own conduct and what he has done to his own child,
and in that way make a better man out of him and a good
16 9
father to his children.
Recently, particularly at the local level, laws have been
adopted which reflect the rationale of the trial judge in the
1949 Seleina case: if parents are punished, or threatened
with punishment, they will become "good" parents to avoid
such punishment. "Good" parents exercise appropriate "control" over their children, and such children do not commit
acts of juvenile delinquency. Although often not reported in
the case law, recent articles in the popular press and a notorious California case suggest that criminal parental liability
laws have recently had a surge of popularity as a "new" response to the juvenile delinquency problem.' 70
167.
168.
169.
170.

93 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1949).
See id. at 44.
Id. at 44-45.
See discussion infra Part III.B.6. and Part IV.
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6. A Trend?: Local "ParentalResponsibility" Statutes
in the 1990s
Local ordinances to create parental responsibility are not
new: parental liability clauses in curfew ordinances have
been typically included in such local laws since the 1950's in
the United States. 17 1 However, on occasion, local communities have enacted broader parental liability ordinances, usually imposing criminal liability for a variety of acts by
children.
Only one appellate case, decided in 1976, has analyzed
such a broad, local parental liability ordinance. In that case,
Doe v. City of Trenton,1 72 the court held that the ordinance in
question was unconstitutional, violating the 14th Amendment due process clause. 1 73 The court's analysis suggests
that such ordinances may be held unconstitutional if they atcriminal liabiltempt to impose what is in essence vicarious
74
ity upon parents for their children's acts.1
The New Jersey city ordinance under consideration in
the Trenton case contained a legal presumption that the parent was responsible for the child's delinquency where his or
her child was twice in one year "adjudged guilty of acts deacts in
fined as violations of the public peace. "1175 These at
of bestatus
of
the
and
for
delinquency
cluded "adjudications
"1176Ths
Thus,
ing a juvenile delinquent in need of supervision.
under this ordinance, the prosecution did not have to prove
the parent's mens rea or the causation element usually required for a criminal conviction of a parent in connection with
the juvenile delinquency of his or her child.
The Trenton court, in its constitutional analysis of the evidentiary presumption, questioned the link between parenting and juvenile delinquency which has been so readily accepted as "rational," without comment or scrutiny, by most
other courts analyzing either tort or criminal parental liabil1 77
ity statutes.
171. See discussion supra Part III.B.4.
172. 362 A.2d 1200 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1202.
176. Id.
177. See cases discussed supra Parts III.A and B. Although courts in both
the civil and criminal cases have tested the constitutional soundness of parental liability statutes using the rational basis test, that test differs in its applica-
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In Trenton, the court commented that "[t]he roots ofjuve-

nile misconduct are complex and imperfectly understood." 7 s
The court ultimately concluded that it was not "more likely
than not" that the child's second adjudication for a breach of
the public peace was "the result of parental action or inaction."179 The court discussed the relationship between the actions of parents and juvenile delinquency as follows:
If there is a consensus at all in the field, it is on the proposition that children growing up in urban poverty areas are
those most likely to be identified as juvenile delinquents.
The City of Trenton provides us with nothing which would
support a finding that parental influence is an overriding
cause ofjuvenile misconduct .... By contrast, plaintiff and
amicus Public Advocate provide a representative sampling of prevailing expert opinion, research and analysis
tending to support the conclusion that parental actions
are but a single factor in the interaction of forces producing juvenile misconduct.18 0
Despite the concerns expressed more than twenty years
ago by the court in the Trenton case regarding the efficacy of
using parental liability statutes to control juvenile delinquency, local governments in the 1990s have turned to such
laws, in various forms, in an attempt to control what is perceived as an epidemic of juvenile crime and violence.' 8
tion, depending on the case setting. Thus, the court's analysis of whether a
legitimate legislative end (controlling juvenile delinquency) is achieved through
a rational means (punishing parents) will differ depending upon whether the
law in question imposes tort damages or criminal penalties. In the Trenton
case, it is not surprising that the legislative means would be most carefully
scrutinized by the court, since the effect of the evidentiary presumptions created by the parental liability statute in that case was to shift the burden of
proof on the critical elements of mens rea and causation to the defendant in a
criminal prosecution. See Trenton, 362 A.2d 1200.
178. Trenton, 362 A.2d at 1203.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citations omitted). The court refers to an analysis of the factors
affecting juvenile delinquency in Penelope D. Clute, Comment, Parental Responsibility Ordinances-Is CriminalizingParents When Children Commit Unlawful Acts a Solution to Juvenile Delinquency?, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1551 (1973),
and also mentions that one author had found that the delinquency rate did not
change after similar criminal parental liability statutes had been enacted, citing SOL RuBIN, CRIME AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 22 (1970).
181. See Barry Siegel, Town Tries to Police the Parents,L. A. TIMEs, Apr. 21,
1996, at Al (parental responsibility ordinance adopted in St. Clair Shores,
Michigan in 1994 which provided for both civil damages and criminal penalties
including fine or imprisonment); Chuck Haga, Farmington May Fine Parents
for Kids' Misbehavior,STAR TRIB., June 22, 1996 at Al (proposed parental crim-
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There are no appellate cases which "test" the constitutionality of these recent ordinances. Articles in the popular press
suggest that convictions under such statutes are rare, and
that they are used as a threat to encourage parents to control
their children.'" 2
Even if such ordinances survive constitutional attack because they require, unlike the law under scrutiny in the Trenton case, that the parent have both knowledge of the child's
behavior (mens rea) and the ability to control the child's behavior (causation), the uses of such ordinances to effectively
control juvenile delinquency is still questionable. As with the
tort liability statutes, a troubling question arises when the
child is an older adolescent: to what extent is a parent expected to "control" an unruly teenager? What actions by the
parent are sufficient to show reasonable attempts to control a
child? And, if such reasonable attempts fail, should the parent still be punished?
For example, what if a father is smaller than his sixteen
year old son, who he knows has committed a series of local
house burglaries and other delinquent acts? If he confronts
the son regarding his actions, and is physically assaulted by
him, is he required to continue efforts to "control" his
child?

1 83

Given the difficulty of obtaining a criminal conviction
against a parent because of the requirements of mens rea and
causation, and the reluctance to pursue convictions resulting
in fines or imprisonment, even if such elements can be
proved, there appear to be substantial limitations to the usefulness of criminal parental liability statutes in the control of
juvenile delinquency. In fact, other than anecdotal evi-

inal liability ordinance being considered by the city council in Farmington, Minnesota); John Leo, Punished for the Sins of the Children, 118 U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT 18, June 12, 1995, (ordinance in Silverton, Oregon and proposed
Oregon statute which included mandatory parenting classes as well as fines in
possible sanctions); Parents are Chargedafter Crime by Kids, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6,
1990 at 3 (Grand Rapids, Michigan enforcing 20 year old criminal parental liability ordinance for the first time in 15 years; the law allows prosecution of parents for failing to exercise "sufficient or reasonable control" over their children).
182. See, e.g., Claire Safran, Is It a Crime to be a Bad Parent? Holding Parents Responsible for Their Children's Delinquency & Crimes, WoMAN's DAY,
May 1, 1990, at 64.
183. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 183, at Al.
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dence,18 4 there is no study which has been discovered which
has even attempted the perhaps impossible task of assessing
whether such criminal statutes do, in fact, result in a change
in the parent's behavior which in turn results in a reduction
in delinquent acts by his or her child.
Lacking empirical validation of their efficacy, the adoption of criminal parental liability laws at the state or local
level appears based entirely on folk wisdom that parents
should be "in control" of their children at all times.
If parents are not "in control," some recent ordinances
provide a less harsh alternative to parental punishment by
fine or incarceration.1 8 5 If parents are not in control of their
children, then they can be coercively taught parenting skills,
so they will become in control (and presumably then can be
punished by harsher means if the children continue their de86
linquent behavior).1

At the state level, a criminal statute in California has
been recently used by The City Attorney's Office of Los Angeles to "encourage" parents to attend parenting classes as a
means of reducing juvenile delinquency.'" 7 Unlike various
recent local ordinances, that statute has been analyzed in detail in a California case which finally held that the statute
88

was constitutional.
IV.

PARENTING CLASSES: MANDATORY PARENT SKILLS
TRAINING AS A NEW SOLUTION TO THE JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY PROBLEM

The use of parental liability statutes as a means of controlling juvenile delinquency has taken an new turn in Cali-

fornia, with an amendment to the contributing statute, Penal
Code § 272, ("§ 272") effective in 1988. That amendment ad184. See Judge Paul W. Alexander, What's This About PunishingParents, 12

FED. PROBATION 23 (1948), which has been cited by many authors as an empirical research study of the efficacy of parental liability laws (Alexander concluded
that although sometimes effective, these laws usually did not work to reduce

juvenile delinquency). In fact, Alexander, a judge in the Toledo, Ohio, juvenile
court, did no more than give his opinion about the effectiveness of these laws
based on an informal review of the decisions in his court. No attempt at accepted social science methodology was made (or intended).
185. See discussion infra Part IV.
186. See discussion infra Part IV.

187. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering Supp. 1996).
188. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993), supersedingWilliams v.
Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472 (Ct. App. 1991).
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ded the following language to the statute: "For the purpose of
this section, a parent or legal guardian to any person under
the age of 18 years shall have the duty to exercise reasonable
care, supervision, protection, and control over their minor
child." 8 9
Before the 1988 amendment, the California statute contained more general wording, typical of many contributing
statutes, which provided for punishment of any adult who
contributed to the delinquency of a minor. 190 Under that previous version of § 272, a parent, like any other adult, could
theoretically be prosecuted for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. However, one author concluded that the
California contributing statute was not being used consistently to "correct parental inadequacies" in an effort to reduce
juvenile delinquency, but instead was being used simply to
punish adults for their misconduct in contributing to the delinquency of minors.191
Consequently, the 1988 amendment to § 272 clearly
targeted parents: it was added at the behest of prosecutorial
agencies in the City and County of Los Angeles for the express purpose of deterring juvenile delinquency, particularly
juvenile gang activity, by affecting parental actions perceived
19 2
to cause such delinquency.

The amendment to § 272 was challenged by a taxpayer's
suit, alleging that its enforcement as amended constituted a
waste of public funds since the amended statute was uncon189. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering Supp. 1996).
190. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering 1985).
191. See Raymond J. Vincent, Expanding the Neglected Role of the Parentin
the Juvenile Court, 4 PEPP. L. REV. 523, 531 (1977). In reviewing the 1961
amendment to Section 272, which placed jurisdiction of adults accused of contributing to the delinquency of a minor in the juvenile court, Vincent (at the
time, a sitting judge in the California trial court) concluded that the main purpose of Section 272 was not "rectification of parental inadequacies," but punishment of the adult offender, whether a parent or unrelated adult, for his or her
misconduct. Id. Vincent commented that "[a review of the cases decided under
Section 272] fails to disclose any consistent use of the contributing law as a tool
for correcting parental inadequacies in conjunction with juvenile delinquency
proceedings." Id. at 532. Judge Vincent suggested that the courts in California
were not using the contributing statute as a means of coercing changes in parental conduct "most likely due to a combination of the absence of any valid
indication that this method has been used effectively elsewhere and the overwhelming weight of respected professional opinion in opposition to it." Id. at
532.
192. See discussion infra Part IV.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

stitutionally vague and overbroad on its face, and was also an
unconstitutional interference with the right to privacy under
193
both the federal and state constitutions.
The California Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision,
reversed the decision by the appellate court, which had found
the statute as amended void for vagueness: the California
Supreme Court held that the amendment was neither unconstitutionally vague 194 nor overbroad, 19 5 and did not interfere
with the parents' constitutional right to raise their children,
to educate their children, and to privacy in family life. 196 The

193. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993), superseding Williams v.
Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472 (Ct. App. 1991).
194. On the issue whether the wording of the statute was unconstitutionally
vague, the court concluded that the statute must be definite enough to provide a
standard of conduct for persons who might be prosecuted, and must also provide "a standard for police enforcement and for ascertainment of guilt." Id. at
509. The court asked whether a parent of ordinary intelligence would understand the duty to "supervise" and "control" his or her children. See id. Analogizing to the California parental tort liability statute, the court concluded that
the legislature must have acted "with full knowledge" of the existing tort law,
and must have intended to incorporate into the penal code section the standard
of reasonablesupervision and control contained in the tort cases. See id. at 512.
The court went on to find that it was "impossible" to provide "a comprehensive statutory definition of reasonable supervision and control," but found that
this was unnecessary. See id. at 513. The court found that the concept of "reasonable" supervision and control was specific enough, particularly in light of the
"heightened standard" of duty which the court held was necessarily required by
this criminal statute: the parent's act or failure to act had to be at least criminally negligent. Id. at 513. The court pointed out that criminal negligence was
more than mere civil negligence, requiring an act or omission which was "aggravated, culpable, gross or reckless." Id. The court confirmed that parents who
intentionally failed to perform their duty of supervision and control would also
be liable under Section 272. See id. at 514.
Referring again by analogy to the parental tort liability statute in California, the court further found that "a parent who makes reasonable efforts to control a child but is not actually able to do so does not breach the duty of control
[under Penal Code section 272 as amended]." Id. at 514.
By thus incorporating into the statute definitions and requirements found
in other state criminal and tort statutes, the California Supreme Court was
able to find that the amendment to Penal Code section 272 was not unconstitutionally vague on its face in the notice it gave to parents who might be prosecuted. Similar reasoning by the court supported its finding that the statute was
also not constitutionally void for vagueness on the ground that there was a danger of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. See id. at 516.
195. See Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 516. After commenting that "a facial overbreadth challenge is difficult to sustain," id. at 516, the court concluded, without an in-depth discussion, that the statute was not overbroad. See id. at 517.
196. Id.
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court thus held that Penal Code § 272 as amended was
constitutional. 197
The California Supreme Court decision did not discuss in
198
detail the rationale behind the amendment to the statute.
The court did mention briefly that the amendment was enacted as part of the Street Terrorism Prevention Act, aimed
at reducing the activity of juvenile gangs in the City of Los
Angeles, and stated that it "appear[s] intended to enlist parents as active participants in the effort to eradicate such
gangs."' 99
The court never engaged in an analysis of whether parents generally were a major cause of their children's involvement in such gangs. Commenting on the lower appellate
court's concern about the causal link between parental behavior and juvenile delinquency, the court admitted that the
causal element required for a criminal conviction under the
criminal negligence standard might be difficult to establish:
[Tihe causation element of section 272 could be more difficult to apply when the question is whether a parent's failure to supervise or control a child caused the child to become delinquent than when the parent's potentially
culpable conduct is of a more direct nature-for example,
when the parent is an accomplice of the minor in the commission of the crime.200
The court concluded, however, that "the same causal
question" had not proven "unduly troublesome" under the
California parental tort liability statute, 20 ' and suggested

that the "opportunity for parental diversion" under the statute "suggests that as a practical matter a parent will face
criminal penalties under § 272 for failure to supervise only in
197. See id at 517.
198. See id. at 514-15. The plaintiff-appellant taxpayers had claimed that
the statute set forth a new standard, making parents vicariously liable for the
acts of their children; the defendants (the Los Angeles County District Attorney
and the Los Angeles City Attorney) alternatively claimed that the amendment
to the statute merely clarified the existing duty of parents under section 272
before it was amended. See id. The California Supreme Court felt it was unnecessary to resolve this issue in addressing the constitutional claims before
the court, stating that the analysis would be the same, regardless of whether
the amendment added to, or merely clarified, the prior statutory wording. See
id. at 512-13.
199. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 510 (Cal. 1993), superseding Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472 (Ct. App. 1991).
200. Id. at 515.
201. See id.
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is great and the
those cases in which the parent's culpability
20 2
clear."
correspondingly
connection
causal
The diversion program in question was only briefly referenced by the California Supreme Court in its opinion, which
without further comment or analysis stated that the legislature had adopted a parent diversion program which "under
special circumstances" allowed the probation department to
recommend that parents (or guardians) charged under § 272
could be diverted to "an education, treatment or rehabilitation program;" after successful completion, the criminal
charges would be dismissed.20 3
Although barely touched upon in the California Supreme
Court opinion, a review of the lower court appellate opinion
in the Williams case and contemporaneous popular media reports suggests that the real purpose behind the amendment
to § 272 was to force the parents of children involved in juvenile gangs into parenting classes as part of an aggressive
multifaceted anti-juvenile gang program initiated by the City
and County of Los Angeles.20 4
The lower court first placed the parental liability provisions of § 272 in context, as only one part of a comprehensive
statutory scheme designed to reduce "criminal street gang activity," which consisted primarily of the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (the STEP Act).2 0 5 The court
pointed out that parental criminal liability under § 272 was
not, like the provisions of the STEP Act, specifically targeted
at controlling juvenile criminal street gang activity.20 6
202. Id.
203. See id. at 508, citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.70-75. CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 1001.74 states, in pertinent part: "[I1f the divertee has performed satisfactorily during the period of diversion, the criminal charges shall be dismissed."
See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering Supp. 1996).
204. Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472 (Ct. App. 1991), superseded by
Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
205. See Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474. The STEP Act made participation in
a street gang and its criminal activities punishable as a misdemeanor or felony;
created new sentencing enhancements for felonies committed in conjunction
with street gang activities; and declared buildings or places used by street
gangs for the purpose of gang activity or crimes to be nuisances. See id. citing
CAL. PENAL CODE §186.22 (a) and (b); §186.22a (a) (Deering 1988 and Supp.
1997).
206. See Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474, quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 272. The
court quoted the entire penal code section, apparently to emphasize that it was
a typical contributing statute, making it a crime for any adult to contribute to
the delinquency (or dependency) of a minor child. Only the last sentence of the
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The court found there was no legislative history available
to show the intent of the legislature in enacting the amendment to § 272.207 Although ultimately finding that her testimony was not admissible as an indication of legislative intent,2 °8 the court quoted from the declaration of an aide of the
state senator who had sponsored the bill which included the
STEP Act and the amendment to § 272.209
The aide to the state senator stated that the language for
the bill had actually been drafted by the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office and the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office. 21 0

Her opinion was that these sponsoring

prosecutorial agencies' primary objective in amending § 272
was to use the initiation of criminal prosecutions against parents as a means of diverting those parents into parenting
classes, not as a means of obtaining criminal convictions
against them.2 1 '
The city attorney's office had submitted to the court his
guidelines (the City Attorney Parenting Program Procedures
(CAPP)) for implementing the parental diversion program. 212
The processing procedure for possible § 272 violations under
penal code section, added by the amendment, focused on parental supervision
and control. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (Deering Supp. 1996).
207. See Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478. The court reported that defendants
had submitted a declaration that they had paid a private research firm to conduct a legislative history search on the amendment, and that the search had not
found any committee discussions or legislative hearings on the amendment preserved by either tape or transcription. The court concluded that other documents presented by the defendants regarding the legislative history of the
amendment "also failed to reveal any contemporaneous discussion of the parental responsibility amendment." Id.
208. See id. at 482.
209. See id. at 477-78.
210. See Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472, 477 (Ct. App. 1991), superseded by Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
211. See id. The legislative aide to Senator Robbins, Terri Burns, stated that
the language of the bill (including the STEP Act, § 272 and the diversion program) had come from the L.A. County District Attorney's Office and the L.A.
City Attorney's office. See id. She stated: "Combined with the diversion program, it was our intent that a larger number of prosecutions be initiated
against parents who were in violation of. . . § 272 by omitting their legal responsibilities, yet normally providing education and treatment opportunities
for these individuals." Id.
212. See id. at 478. Those guidelines provided that a parent would only be
prosecuted if "he/she knew or should have known that his/her conduct was
likely to result in delinquency and he/she had some ability to control the child."
See id. Thus, the city attorney claimed to be requiring the elements of mens rea
and causation which the California Supreme Court would eventually find the
amended Section 272 required. See discussion supra note 194.
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the city attorney's CAPP program suggests that agencies use
§ 272 primarily as a means of getting parents into parenting
programs, not as a means of criminally prosecuting them.
First, the city attorney's office initially reviews the documents submitted by any referring agency recommending
prosecution of a parent under § 272.213 The next step is the
referral of the documentation to an administrator of the
parenting program for an office hearing with the parent(s).214
In that meeting, the parent is offered a chance to avoid possible criminal prosecution by enrolling in a parent training/
counseling program chosen by the administrator.2 15 Step
three is the prosecution of parents failing to participate in the
parenting program.216
The use of amended § 272 by the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office, both before and after the California Supreme
Court decision in the Williams case, confirms that a new rationale for parental liability statutes is being tested in California: if lack of adequate parental control and supervision is
a primary cause of juvenile delinquency (and particularly
participation in juvenile gangs engaging in criminal behavior), then perhaps parent training, not parent punishment,
will provide the much desired deterrent effect.
At the time the Williams case was appealed, there was a
notorious case which had received much publicity in the popular media, both locally and nationally. In that case, Gloria
Williams, a single, African American mother residing with
her children in a gang-infested neighborhood in South Los
Angeles, was charged with violating § 272 after her teenage
son was accused of participating in a vicious rape of a young
girl by members of a juvenile street gang.217 When it was
determined that she had attended parenting classes before
she was arrested, the charges against Ms. Williams were
dropped.218
213. See id. at 479.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472, 479 (Ct. App. 1991), superseded by Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
217. See Ginger Thompson, Gang Member's Mother Denies Failure Charge,
L.A. TimEs, May 20, 1989, Metro at 1; Phillip Carrizosa, Prosecutionsof Gang
Members' Parents Allowed, L.A. DAILY J., July 2, 1993, at 1.
218. See Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476-77.
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Her case was apparently an impetus for the taxpayer's
suit in Williams, although the fact she had the same name as
the named plaintiff in that case appears coincidental. 2 19 The
plaintiffs in the Williams case raised the Gloria Williams in220
cident in their argument before the lower appellate court
as referenced in that court's opinion; the California Supreme
Court opinion does not refer to the Gloria Williams matter at
all.22 1 The plaintiffs used Gloria Williams as an example of
the "pernicious reach" of the statute, claiming that the only
evidence of Ms. Williams encouragement of her son's gang activities, as reported in two articles in the L.A. Times newspaper, were pictures of her and her children using street gang
signs.2 2 2 Plaintiffs claimed that the defendant prosecutors
intended to enforce § 272 against the parents of children belonging to juvenile gangs "even though many of the factors
which may lead children to associate with gang members are
beyond the parents' control."22 3
The prosecution of Gloria Williams resulted in a flurry of
press and television coverage of the parental liability statute,
as amended. Defendant Ira Reiner, District Attorney for the
County of Los Angeles, as quoted by plaintiffs in their moving
papers, had stated in a television interview: "These... gangs
are made up of nothing but just a pack of killers.. ..Each
and every one of them is a sociopathic killer. The Crips and
the Bloods are nothing but killers ....Frankly, I think it is a
very good policy to hold these kinds of parents
accountable."2 2 4
Exactly what are "these kinds of parents?" Other popular press reports of reactions to the Gloria Williams incident
suggests that "these parents" are perceived more as unskilled
"trainable" parents, than as lazy or malicious parents.2 2 5 If
this is the case, does parent skills training offer a possible
way of reducing juvenile delinquency when children appear
219. See id. at 472.
220. See id. at 475.
221. See Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
222. See Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472, 476 (Ct. App. 1991), superseded by Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
223. Id.
224. Id., quoting from plaintiffs moving papers, citing 'Crossfire' (television
broadcast, May 9, 1989).
225. See, e.g., Gloria Molina, Law On ParentalResponsibility, L.A. TIMES,
July 11, 1989, Metro, pt.2 at 6.

662

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

to be beyond the control of their parents? Unfortunately, the
Los Angeles City Attorney's Office has not published any assessment of its training program: it is impossible to conclude
whether that program has been effective or not. Information
from the popular press indicates that although very few parents have actually been prosecuted under § 272 in Los Angeles, by mid-1993 over a thousand parents had been referred
to parenting classes, and over 600 had actually completed the
classes, to avoid prosecution.2 2 6
Since there is no direct information from the Los Angeles
City Attorney's program about its effectiveness, how can we
consider applying substantial public resources to maintaining the program, and forcing parents to participate in it? Do
the theories and research on the causes of juvenile delinquency offer some insights into the efficacy of parental punishment or parental training as a means of reducing juvenile
delinquency?
V.

THEORIES AND RESEARCH IN SUPPORT OF PARENTAL

LIABILITY FOR JUVENILE DELINQUENCY:
No EASY SOLUTIONS

A review of the parental liability laws in the United
States, whether civil or criminal in nature, and of both the
official and popular reasoning which supports these laws,
presents a consistent theme: juvenile delinquency will be reduced if parents are threatened with civil or criminal penalties for their children's delinquent acts.2 2 7 Sometimes expressed, more often unstated but clearly implied, is the
conviction that parents generally have the ability to prevent
delinquent behavior in their children by appropriate supervision and control of the child.2 28 Thus, the parent is presumed
to be a significant, if not exclusive, causal agent in the delinquency of his or her child.
Further, the case decisions, the legislative history, and
the popular press, in presenting a rationale for punishing
parents for the delinquent acts of their children, often either
explicitly or implicitly suggest that the lack of supervision
and control of children is due primarily to negligence or laziness on the part of the parents. The parents know what to do
226. See Carrizosa, supra note 217.
227. See discussion supra Part III.

228. See discussion supra Part III.
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2 29
and when to do it, but are at some level "choosing" not to.
Thus, the threat of either civil or criminal liability is perceived as the added incentive needed for the parent to do
what the parent knows she or he should do, and can do.23 °
The adoption of the amendment to § 272 in California in
1988, and its present use by the City Attorney's Office in Los
Angeles, suggests a different rationale for these laws: parents are not choosing to be "bad" parents, they simply are not
properly trained to be "good" parents. 2 31 This new rationale
for parental liability laws has resulted in the Los Angeles
City Attorney's Office embracing parenting classes as at least
part of the solution to the juvenile delinquency problem.2 3 2
Notably lacking in the case law, legislative history, or
popular press discussion of parental liability laws is a critical
analysis of the premises upon which they are based.2 3 3 Since
the constitutionality of these laws has generally been tested
under a rational basis analysis, courts have tended to approve the legislative decision to make parents criminally or
civilly liable for their children's delinquent acts without much
discussion of the underlying legislative reasoning. Of course,
the criminal statutes generally require that the elements of
mens rea and criminal causation be proved as to the parent,
but the cases do not appear to seriously question that causation can be proved.23 4
A review of the scholarly discourse and research in the
interdisciplinary area of juvenile justice provides additional
useful insights into the legitimacy of the legal focus on parental liability. Certainly the definition of the problem of juvenile delinquency necessarily defines the solutions, legal and
otherwise, which are proposed and implemented.2 3 5
Below are summarized some of the most widely accepted
theories about the causes of juvenile delinquency which have
been developed in the scholarly literature. 2 36 The role of the
parent in such theories, if any, is discussed.2 3 7 Following the

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

discussion supra Part III.
discussion supra Part III.
discussion supra Part IV.
discussion supra Part IV.
discussion supra Part III.
discussion supra Parts III, IV.
M.A. BORTNER, supra note 22, at 205.
discussion infra Part V.A.
discussion infra Part V.A.
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discussion of theory is a review of recent empirical research
which might provide some insights to the questions: (1) Does
"bad" parenting cause juvenile delinquency?; (2) If so, can
"bad" parenting be corrected by parenting classes?; and, finally, (3) If "good" parenting can be taught, does a change in
the parent's parenting skills in fact reduce juvenile delinquency in that parent's child, as the Los Angeles approach
2 38
presumes?
A.

Theories of the Causes of Juvenile Delinquency:
The Role of the Parent

Juvenile delinquency and its causes has been the subject
of scholarly comment and research in a number of disciplines,
including anthropology, criminology, law, psychology, psychiatry, sociology and social work. 23 9 Not surprisingly, given the
variety of perspectives across these disciplines and the multiplicity of factors which might affect all types of human behavior, including juvenile delinquency, no consensus has developed regarding the causes of juvenile delinquency.2 4 °
The "bad parents cause juvenile delinquency" theory has
enjoyed a great deal of popularity in the 20th century United
States, first, in the development of the juvenile justice system, 2 4 1 and second, in the development of a statutory scheme
in most states for both criminal and tort liability of parents
for the juvenile delinquency of their children.2 4 2
Despite this popularity among laypeople, lawyers and
legislators, most theories about the causes of juvenile delinquency do not focus primarily on parenting skills; in fact,
many respected current theories ignore or minimize the importance of parenting skills in the causation of juvenile delinquency. The current most popular theories, drawn from a
number of disciplines, are discussed briefly below, emphasizing the role that parenting plays in each theory.
1.

Biological Theories

Now discredited, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries there were several respected proponents of the theory
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See
See
See
See
See

discussion infra Part V.B.
Geis & Binder, supra note 104, at 83-197.
id.
discussion supra Part II.
discussion supra Part III.
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that juvenile delinquency was primarily caused by biological
factors, and that criminals could be recognized because of
their distinct physiological characteristics.2 4 3
Recently, biological theories have become popular
again.2 4 4 Medical research in the areas of brain tumors and
other disorders, hormonal imbalances and other abnormalities of the endocrine system, hyperkinesis, chromosomal abnormalities, birth defects, nutritional deficiencies and learning disabilities, have all generated hypotheses that there may
be a link between biological factors and deviant behavior, including juvenile delinquency.2 45
However, it has been suggested that this is due not only
to technological advances, but also for political and social reasons. 2 46 If biological factors primarily cause deviant criminal
behavior such as juvenile delinquency, then the solutions will
be medical or other therapeutic interventions aimed at the
individual.2 4 7 It has been suggested such medical solutions
to the problem of juvenile delinquency are politically
motivated:
[B]iological theories deflect attention away from the role
of society and social relations in generating human behavior, including nonconformity and crime .... Essentially,
if the public believes that nonconformity is "preordained"
by biology or inevitable due to biological factors it may reof social responsibility for
sult in... a denial or abdication
2 48
producing such behavior.
Parenting is not a focus of the biological theories at all
(although parents are, as a potential source of inherited characteristics). However, if the problem of juvenile delinquency
were defined as bad parenting, the same criticism could be
243. See M.A. BORTNER, supra note 22, at 206. The biological determinists
included Cesare Lombroso, Ernest Hooten, and William Sheldon. See id. at
207. Sheldon, for example, proposed that certain physiques corresponded to
certain temperaments, based on his study of 200 delinquent boys, who he concluded were predominantly mesomorphic, with muscular bodies and heavy
bones, among other physical characteristics. See id. Sheldon's work has been
criticized for failing to recognize the socio-ecological context of physical characteristics: behavior may be influenced by the stereotypes society gives to certain
body types; a big, strong boy may be perceived as a bully, for example. See id.
244. See id. at 208.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. Id. at 209.
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leveled: both biological theories and "bad parent" theories direct attention toward changing the individual and his family,
and important socio-economic forces which may be related to
juvenile delinquency may then be ignored.
2. Strain (Anomie) Theories
Strain theories, sometimes called "anomie" theories, presume that people generally are socialized into the majority
society, and therefore want to achieve the goals championed
by that society.24 9 However, when a person cannot achieve
such goals by means approved by the society, strain theories
hypothesize that a person will attempt to achieve those goals
by resorting to deviant behavior.2 50 Thus, for example, the
juvenile delinquent who steals a car is presumed to subscribe
to an accepted goal of the majority society: success measured
by material wealth. Unable to obtain this goal through
means accepted by the larger society as "legitimate," for example by obtaining a job and buying the car, the delinquent
will violate the moral standards of society (which she or he
accepts) to obtain the desired goal by the deviant behavior of
stealing the car.
The focus of strain theories is thus the tension which develops when a child who has adopted the aspirations of the
majority society does not have the ability or access, within his
or her immediate environment, of achieving those aspirations
in ways the society approves as legitimate. 25 1 The supervi-

sion and control of the parent, or other parenting skills, are
not perceived by this theory as a primary cause of juvenile
delinquency; instead, socio-ecological factors are perceived as
most important.
Strain theories have been criticized because they suggest
that juvenile delinquency is restricted to the "lower class," because they suggest that delinquency is a permanent attribute
of a person, and because they suggest that by adopting goals
and values which are approved by the majority society, a
252
child is more likely to become delinquent.
249.
250.
251.
252.

See
See
See
See

TRAvis HIRSCHI,
id.
id. at 5.
id. at 9-10.
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3. Cultural Deviance and DifferentialAssociation
Theories
Whereas strain theories presume that the juvenile delinquent is a child frustrated in his or her achievement of the
goals of the majority culture by legitimate means,253 cultural
deviance and differential association theories presume that
the child has never adopted the values and goals of the majority culture at all.254 Instead, it is presumed that the juvenile
delinquent has adopted values and goals of a subculture (for
example, an urban juvenile gang), which approve of and encourage the juvenile delinquent acts.255 It is presumed that
the child is socialized into this alternative "deviant" culture
and learns delinquency from socializing within the deviant
group.25 6 According to this theory, parents "cause" juvenile
delinquency if they are part of the "deviant" subculture themselves and thus instrumental in the child's acculturation into
that deviant culture.25 7
This theory lends support to the popular idea that "bad"
parents cause delinquency in their children. However, it does
not support the wisdom of Los Angeles County's use of
parenting classes, since according to this theory parents are
not merely ignorant, they are in fact intentionally encouraging the acts of delinquency in their children by the values
which they hold themselves. Furthermore, if the parents are
not part of the deviant subculture, these theories would suggest that changes in parental control and supervision will not
matter, unless such changes can detach the child from the
subculture whose values he has adopted.
Although heavily criticized, cultural deviance theories
have remained a very popular perspective on juvenile delinquency theory and research.258
4.

Control Theories

According to control theories, juvenile delinquency occurs
when the child's bonds to conventional society are "weak or
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

See
See
See
See
See
See

discussion supra Part V.A.2.
HIRSCHI, supra note 249, at 11-12.
id. at 11-12.
id.
id.
id. at 13 (footnotes omitted).
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broken."259 According to Travis Hirschi, one of the most

respected proponents of control theory, there are four important elements of this bond to conventional society: attach263
ment,26 ° commitment,26 1 involvement,262 and belief.
The first element, attachment, refers to the child's affection for, and attachment to, various persons and institutions
within society.264 The terms "indirect control" or "internal
control" refer to the same element.265 Different control theorists have answered the question: "bond to whom?" in various
ways.266 Hirschi, in his pioneering work, emphasizes the
child's attachment to parents,267 to the school and teachers,268 and to peers.269
The second element, commitment, Hirschi defines as follows: "Few would deny that men on occasion obey the rules
simply from fear of the consequences. This rational compo2 70
nent in conformity we label commitment."

The third element, involvement, reflects the idea that
substantial time and energy directed toward "conventional"
activities (schooling, work, hobbies) leaves little time for delinquent acts. 1
The fourth element of control theories, belief, particularly distinguishes control theory from deviant culture theories: "The person is assumed to have been socialized (perhaps imperfectly) into the group whose rules he is violating
.... [We not only assume the deviant has believed the rules,

we assume he believes the rules even as he violates them."272
Parents, then, are presumed to heavily influence
whether their children commit acts of juvenile delinquency:
"It is in control theory [as compared to other theories of juvenile delinquency], then, that attachment to parents becomes
259. See id. at 16.
260. See HIRSCHI, supra note 249, at 16.
261. See id. at 20.
262. See id. at 21.
263. See id. at 23.
264. See id. at 19.
265. See id. (footnotes omitted), referring to terms used by another control
theorist, F. Ivan Nye, in his research and writings.
266. See HIRSCHI, supra note 249, at 19.
267. See id. at 85.
268. See id. at 120.
269. See id. at 134-61.
270. Id. at 20.
271. Id.
272. See HiRsCHI, supra note 249, at 23.
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a central variable, and many of the variations in explanations
of this relation may be found within the control theory
tradition."273
Control theories have been criticized for emphasizing official definitions of delinquency and official statistics (for example, police records), for uncritically accepting a scientific
model, for a traditional correctional focus that emphasizes
adjusting the juvenile to the larger society, for ignoring the
role of the juvenile court in defining and perpetuating delinquency, and finally for ignoring the importance of overall
socio-economic factors which might affect delinquency.274
B.

Parentingand Juvenile Delinquency: Current
Empirical Studies
1. Does Poor ParentingCause Juvenile Delinquency?

Because control theories, of all the currently popular theories regarding the causes of juvenile delinquency, focus most
directly upon the role of the parents, and support a scientific
model, it is not surprising that much of the empirical research on parenting and juvenile delinquency is grounded in
a control theory approach. The results of current empirical
research suggest that a parent's actions may affect whether a
child commits juvenile delinquent acts, but such research is
far from conclusive, or consistent.
For example, Harriet Wilson, in a 1980 study conducted
in Great Britain, explored whether the amount of supervision
of children by their parents was related to the amount of juvenile delinquent acts by the children.275 Her study analyzed
children in urban and suburban environments.276 Concluding that juvenile delinquency was in fact related to lack of
parental supervision, Wilson cautioned against a conclusion
that parents therefore caused the delinquency.2 77 She concluded that the lack of supervision by parents was caused by
"severe social handicap:" those parents in the poorest and
273. Id. at 86.
274. See M.A. BORTNER, supra note 22, at 229.
275. See Harriet Wilson, ParentalSupervision:A Neglected Aspect of Delinquency, 20 BRIT. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 203 (1980).
276. See id. at 204.
277. See id. at 233-34.
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most crime-infested areas, and with the most limited resources, were the ones providing the least supervision.278
Another study by Phyllis Gray-Ray and Melvin C. Ray in
1990 used a control theory model to test the relationship between parenting and juvenile delinquency in a sample of African American delinquent children.279 They concluded that
the traditional control theory model did not entirely apply:
"direct control" of children by their parents in the form of
structure and supervision did not correlate with lower juvenile delinquency (the theory predicted it would), although parental rejection of children did correlate with increased juvenile delinquency (as the theory had predicted).2 8 0

The

authors hypothesized that differences between the family
structure in Mrican American families and majority culture
white families might cause the difference in results obtained
by these authors.28 1
Ruth Seydlitz, in a 1993 article, states that a "major
problem in the field of delinquency is the low explanatory
power of the theories."282 She criticizes control theories for
being too simplistic, and often ignoring the affects upon delinquency of significant variables such as gender of the child,
age of the child, and type of delinquency.2 8 3 She concludes
that "the social control theories . . . and power-control the-

ory-cannot account for the complexity in the relationship
between parents and delinquency." 28 4 She suggests that

more research is needed and that current control theories
and other theories may need to be revised to take into account the complexity of the relationships as reflected in her
study.285
Thus, even among those researchers accepting a theory
of delinquency which posits that parenting has a relationship
to whether a child commits delinquent acts, there is not a
consensus that empirical research unreservedly "proves" this
278. See id.
279. See Phyllis Gray-Ray & Melvin C. Ray, Juvenile Delinquency in the
Black Community, 22(1) YOUTH & Soc'v 67 (1990).

280. See id. at 78-81.
281. See id.
282. Ruth Seydlitz, Complexity in the RelationshipsAmong Direct and Indirect Parental Controls and Delinquency, 24(3) YOUTH & Soc'y 243 (1993).
283. See id. at 244.
284. Id.
285. See id. at 268.
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key rationale for the parental liability laws in the United
States. Most current researchers concede that the relationship between the family and juvenile delinquency is complex,
and that a "bad" parent is not the sole cause of a "bad" child.
2.

Will ParentingClasses Decrease Juvenile
Delinquency?

Nonetheless, some empirical support for parenting
classes as a solution to juvenile delinquency does exist. A
1988 article by Mark W. Fraser, J. David Hawkins and Matthew 0. Howard has summarized prior research in this area
and concluded that consistent child-rearing practices can be
taught in parenting classes, and that such consistent childrearing practices do in fact increase the attachment of the
child to the parent, and decrease juvenile delinquent acts by
the child.28 6
At present, a longitudinal study is being conducted by
Jerry Patterson of the Oregon Social Learning Center, under
a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health.2 " 7 Patterson has claimed that "simple parenting skills" which can
be taught, can overcome other factors which may affect delinquency, such as poverty or bad schools.28 8
VI.

CONCLUSION

Parental liability laws in the United States first became
popular in the 1950's and 1960's, and they continue to be enforced today against parents as a means of controlling juvenile delinquency. Under the tort parental liability statutes,
parents are vicariously liable for civil damages in tort for the
delinquent acts of their children. Although neither parental
knowledge nor action is required for such vicarious liability
based solely on the parent/child relationship, the premise behind the tort legislation seems to be that parents should
know how to control their children, should have the ability to
do so, and should therefore be held responsible if the child
commits delinquent acts which cause injury to innocent third
parties and/or damage to property.
286. See Mark W. Fraser, J. David Hawkins & Matthew 0. Howard, Parent
Training for Delinquency Prevention, in FAMILY PERSPECTIVES IN CHILD AND
YOUTH SERVICES 93 (1988).
287. See Vince Bielski, Bad to the Bone?, CALIFORNIA LAw., Oct. 1993 at 73.
288. See id. at 76.
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Under the criminal parental liability laws, the elements
of both criminal intent and criminal causation on the part of
the parent must be proved in order to convict him or her in
connection with the truancy, curfew violations, or other delinquent acts by his or her child. Thus, for criminal liability to
attach, the prosecuting agency must show that the parent did
indeed have actual control over the minor child, which he or
she failed to adequately exercise. In many instances this
may, in fact, be the case. But what if the child is in fact realistically beyond the parent's control? In that event, the Los
Angeles City Attorney's Office has suggested an easy solution: train the parent to be an effective parent, and the child
will then be under the parent's effective control, and the
child's acts of delinquency will cease.
Some empirical research suggests that, in some cases,
parents can be trained to be more effective parents, and learn
to better supervise and control their children. In those cases,
parent training (if adequate) may in fact result in the reduction of juvenile delinquency. However, what if the act ofjuvenile delinquency which is the basis of the parent's prosecution is due primarily to other factors, and not to the parent's
faulty supervision and control? Then neither parent training
nor parent punishment will help. Although the sweeping social reform suggested in the 1960's has been rejected as unworkable and perhaps naive, the severe social problems
which the reformers sought to address: poverty, inner city
slums, lack of educational, recreational, and job opportunities
for many youth, and other problems of our complex urban society, have not disappeared. When children are beyond their
parent's control, then parental liability legislation will not reduce juvenile delinquency. Thus, the parental liability laws
in the United States provide only a limited solution to the
multifaceted problem of juvenile delinquency, and that solution has not been shown to be particularly effective.

